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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY




The adoption in June 1998 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights (African Human Rights Court)1 by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is
potentially an important step in the protection of human rights in the African
continental system. 2 The African Human Rights Court would complement3
* Makau Mutua is a Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, Spring 1999 and Associate
Professor, SUNY-Buffalo School of Law. He is Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY-Buffalo
and Chair of the Kenya Human Rights Commission. The author received his S.J.D. in 1987
from Harvard Law School, an LL.M. in 1985 from Harvard Law School, an LL.M. in 1984
from University of Dar-es-salaam; and his LL.B. in 1983 from University of Dar-es-salaam.
1. Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establish-
ment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights by the Assembly of Heads of
State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, Conference of Ministers/
Attorneys General on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples'
Rights, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPRIPROT.(I)Rev.2 (1997) [hereinafter Protocol].
2. See Gino J. Naldi & Konstantinos Magliveras, Reinforcing the African System of Human
Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HuM. RTs. 431 (1998); 2 U. Oji UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON
HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 92-93 (1997); Pursuit for Peace Remains Major Task of Africa:
Salim, XINHUA NEws AGENCY, 8 June 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS
File; International Conference on Human Rights Commission Opens in Addis, XINHUA
NEws AGENCY, 18 May 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. As
expected, the Draft Protocol was adopted by the 1998 OAU summit in Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso. See Ghion Hagos, Africa at Large; Conference Adopts Protocol on African
Human Rights Court, AFR. NEws, 13 Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File; Ghion Hagos, Africa at Large; Africa Human Rights Court on the Cards,
AFR. NEws, 11 Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
3. The Protocol is now open for sighature following its adoption by the OAU. It shall come
into force thirty days after ratification by fifteen OAU member states, a number that
should be reached quickly. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 34. The Protocol states in the
preamble that the African Human Rights Court shall "complement and reinforce the
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the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commis-
sion), the body that has exercised continental oversight over human rights
since 1987.4 The Protocol suggests that the African Human Rights Court will
make the promotion and the protection of human rights within the regional
system more effective. s However the mere addition of a court, although a
significant development, is unlikely by itself to address sufficiently the
normative and structural weaknesses that have plagued the African human
rights system since its inception.
The modern African state, which in many respects is colonial to its core,
has been such an egregious human rights violator that skepticism about its
ability to create an effective regional human rights system is appropriate.
6
Although the African Charter makes a significant contribution to the human
rights corpus, it creates an ineffectual enforcement system. Its most notable
contributions are the codification of the three "generations" of rights,
including the innovative concept of peoples' rights/ and the imposition of
duties on individuals.8 But many commentators have focused on the
functions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights." Protocol, supra
note 1, pmbl. The Protocol continues to clarify and emphasize that the African Human
Rights Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights." Protocol, supra note 1, art. 2.
4. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Commission) is the
supervisory organ for the implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted 26 June 1981, O.A.U.
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982) [hereinafter African Charter]. The African Charter is also known as the Banjul
Charter.
5. See Protocol, supra note 1, pmbl.
6. For discussions and analyses of the colonial imprint on the African post-colonial state,
see MAHMOOD MAMDANI, CmZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPORARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE
COLONIALISM (1996); Crawford Young, The Heritage of Colonialism, in AFRICA IN WORLD
PoLmcs 19 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothschild eds., 1991); Robert H. Jackson,
Juridical Statehood in Sub-Saharan Africa, 46 J. INT'L AFF. 1 (1992); Ali A. Mazrui, The
African State as a Political Refugee: Institutional Collapse and Human Displacement, 7
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 21 (1995); and Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A
Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995). Discussing Africa's colonial
legacy, one author notes that the "most obvious and powerful expressions of the
continued African conceptual reliance on European political forms are the African states
themselves. The states are direct and uncritical successors of the colonies." Art Hansen,
African Refugees: Defining and Defending Their Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 139, 161 (Ronald Cohen et al. eds., 1993).
7. Peoples' rights, along with rights to environment and group rights, are known as third-
generation rights. Civil and political rights are considered first-generation rights, and
social, economic, and cultural rights are considered second-generation rights.
8. On duties on the individual, see African Charter, supra note 4, at arts. 27-29. For a
discussion of the concept of duties in human rights discourse and the African Charter,
see Makau wa Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995). See also Obinna
Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American Systems, 6
Hum. RTs. Q. 141 (1984); Josiah A.M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights
Debate: An African Perspective, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 309 (1987).
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weaknesses in the African system. These include the "clawback" clauses in
the African Charter, the potential abuse of the language of duties, and the
absence of an effective protection mandate for the African Commission.9
Recent changes in the African states, particularly those changes re-
sponding to demands for more open political societies, may augur well for
the protection of civil and political rights. 10 Emergent democracies such as
Namibia, Malawi, Benin, South Africa, Tanzania, and Mali are more
inclined than their predecessors to respect human rights at home and to
agree to a more viable regional system. In this context, the proposed African
Human Rights Court would operate in a less hostile or cynical environment
than the environment that determined and sharply limited the powers and
effectiveness of the African Commission. In addition, the 1994 Rwandese
genocide and the recent atrocities in Nigeria, Liberia, Somalia, Ethiopia,
Sudan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Republic of the Congo, and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo have further illuminated the need for stronger
domestic and regional guarantees for human rights. In fact, at no time in
recent African history have the conditions for the creation of an effective
regional human rights system been more favorable.
This article critically evaluates the proposed African Human Rights
Court and assesses its potential impact on the African human rights system.
It probes the powers of the Court and asks whether a clear and mutually
reinforcing division of labor between it and the African Commission could
be developed to more effectively promote and protect human rights on the
continent. For example, should the mandate of the African Commission be
limited primarily to promotional activities, and the African Human Rights
Court exclusively given the protective function? What relationship should
the Court have to the African Commission?
In sum, this article explores the effect that the African Human Rights
Court is likely to have in three principal areas. First, it examines the role of
the African Human Rights Court in the development of the law of the
African Charter and other relevant human rights instruments. Second, it
addresses ways in which the Court can fill the lacunae left by the African
9. For discussions of these problems, see Richard Gittleman, The African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667 (1982); Richard
Gittleman, The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Prospects and
Procedures, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 153 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
1984); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn Ankumah, The African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 159 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
2d ed. 1992).
10. See Makau wa Mutua, African Renaissance, N.Y. TIMES, 11 May 1991, at L23 (describing
the demands by Africans for political democracy); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH WORLD REPORT 1993, at 6-9 (1992) (reporting Africa's political upheavals,
including those related to demands for political reforms and democracy).
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Commission and alleviate some of its weaknesses. Finally, it discusses ways
in which the Court can penetrate the legal and political cultures of African
states to inspire, encourage, and ensure the internalization of human rights.
II. AMBIGUITY AND ANEMIA: THE STATUS QUO
The African human rights system is anchored in the African Charter, an
instrument that is largely promotional with an ambiguous protective
function and no credible enforcement mechanism. This is hardly surprising
because virtually no African state, with the exceptions of the Gambia,
Senegal, and Botswana could even boast of a nominal democracy in 1981,
the year that the OAU adopted the African Charter." Hopes by observers of
the African Commission that its commissioners would robustly construe the
Charter's powers to alleviate its weaknesses have largely gone unrealized.
With respect to specific functions, and to its performance in general, the
African Commission has been a disappointment. This section discusses the
architecture of the African Commission and outlines its basic strengths and
weaknesses.
The basic functions of the African Commission are both promotional
and protective.12 The promotional function, which the Charter empha-
sizes, 13 includes research and dissemination of information through work-
shops and symposia, the encouragement of national and local human rights
institutions, the formulation of principles to address legal problems in
human rights, and cooperation with African and international human rights
institutions.14 The Commission is empowered to interpret the Charter at the
request of a state party, the OAU, or any organization recognized by the
OAU.' 5 In contrast, the provision relating to the protective function is quite
terse. It provides, without elaborating, only that the Commission shall
"[e]nsure the protection of human and peoples' rights" in the Charter.
16
More concretely, the African Charter charges the Commission with
three principal functions: examining state reports, 17 considering communi-
11. See Makau wa Mutua, The African Human Rights System in a Comparative Perspective,
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS, 3 REV. AFR. COMM'N ON HuM. & PEOPLES'
RTs. 5 (1993).
12. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 45, which sets out the functions of the African
Commission.
13. Id. (providing largely for promotional, not protective, functions of the Commission).
14. See id. art. 45(l).
15. See id. art. 45(3). This role, which allows the Commission to interpret the Charter, is
potentially one of the areas that the commissioners could seize upon to expound and
clarify the Charter.
16. Id. art. 45(2).
17. See id. art. 62. States parties must submit, every two years, a report on the legislative
and other measures taken to give effect to rights in the African Charter. Id.
1999
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cations alleging violations,1" and expounding the African Charter.19 These
functions follow the general script of other regional as well as universal
human rights bodies.20 In particular, the Commission seems to have drawn
substantially from the procedures and experiences of the UN Human Rights
Committee.21 Its Rules of Procedure 2 2 which provide for process before the
Commission, and the Reporting Guidelines,2 3 which specify the form and
content of state reports, mirror the lessons of other human rights bodies. The
Guidelines were supplemented by General Directives, an unpublished
document that was sent to foreign ministers of state parties in 1990.24 The
Directives are just a precis of the Guidelines.
The Commission's primary protective function, that of considering
complaints filed by individual victims as well as nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), 2s has a large potential that thus far has not been realized. For
example, the Charter places no restriction as to who may file a communica-
tion. This lack of restriction creates an opening that allows any individual,
groups, or NGOs, whether or not they are the direct victims of the alleged
violation, to lodge a petition. 26 However, communications27 can only be
18. See id. arts. 47, 55. The Charter permits two types of communications: from individuals,
NGOs, and groups, on the one hand, and inter-state communications, on the other. The
latter has never been invoked and will not concern this article. Id.
19. See id. art. 45(3).
20. See Philip Alston, Critical Appraisal of the UN Human Rights Regime, in THE UNITED
NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). See generally
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: IN A NUTSHELL 21-247 (2d. ed. 1995)
(describing UN Charter-based and treaty-based human rights instruments and bodies, as
well as the African, Inter-American, and European human rights systems).
21. The Human Rights Committee is the treaty body that oversees the implementation of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force 23 Mar. 1976).
22. Revised Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
adopted 6 Oct. 1995, reprinted in 18 HUM. Rrs. L.J. 154 (1997) [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure].
23. Guidelines for National Periodic Reports, Second Annual Activity Report of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Annex III, AFR/COM/HPR.5(VI)(1989)
[hereinafter Reporting Guidelines].
24. See ASTRID DANIELSEN, THE STATE REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE AFRICAN CHARTER 51-52 (1994);
EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS: PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURES 82-83 (1996).
25. The African Charter requires that the Commission "cooperate" with African and
international NGOs in its work. African Charter, supra note 4, art. 45(1)(a) & (c). Thus
the Commission grants human rights NGOs observer status which allows their
representatives to participate in the public sessions of the Commission. See Rules of
Procedure, supra note 22, rule 75.
26. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 55.
27. "Communication" is usually used as a euphemism for "complaint" by the international
human rights bodies.
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considered by the Commission if they meet certain conditions, including
the requirements that they: indicate their authors, even if anonymity is
requested; are not written in a language that is insulting or disparaging to
the state or the OAU; are not incompatible with the OAU Charter and the
African Charter; are not based exclusively on media reports; are sent after
the petitioner exhausts local remedies, unless these are obviously unduly
prolonged; are submitted within a reasonable time after local remedies are
exhausted; and do not deal with a matter that has already been settled by
the states concerned in accordance with international instruments.
2 8
Although the Charter does not explicitly require it, communications are
considered in private or closed sessions.29 If the Commission determines
that one or more communications "relate to special cases which reveal the
existence of a series of serious or massive violations" 30 of human rights, it
must draw the attention of the OAU to such a situation and, presumably,
conduct an on-site investigation. In the case of an emergency, the Commis-
sion must inform the Chair of the OAU and request an in-depth study, which
most likely would call for on-site fact-finding.31 The Commission's power to
conduct such investigations is clearly authorized by the Charter, which
empowers it to "resort to any appropriate method of investigation." 32 This
provision had remained a dead letter until 1995 when the Commission,
with the assistance of the OAU Secretary General, secured the agreement of
Senegal and Togo for field investigations.3 3 Until this point however, the
commissioners had been reluctant to claim these powers.3
4
The Commission's formula for considering individual communications
closely mirrors that of the UN Human Rights Committee (HRC). 3 1 In a
28. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 56.
29. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 22, rule 106. The Commission, which makes its own
rules of procedure, may justify closed sessions for communications under Article 59 of
the Charter which provides, in part, that "[aill measures taken within the provisions of
the present Chapter [sic] shall remain confidential" until the OAU decides otherwise.
African Charter, supra note 4, art. 59. But this provision is overbroad and vague. A literal
interpretation of "all measures" would be absurd. Perhaps the Commission could open
at least part, if not all, of the communications processes to the public.
30. African Charter, supra note 4, art. 58(1) & (2).
31. See id. art. 58(3).
32. Id. art. 46.
33. See Final Communique: 17th Ordinary Session of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, 12-22 Mar. 1995, Lome, Togo, available in <http-//wwwl .umn.edu/
humanrts/africa/achprl 7f.html>; ANKUMAH, supra note 24, at 42.
34. Because the Commission did not carry out investigations from 1987 until 1995, it seems
to have been reluctant to do so.
35. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976),




format similar to that of the HRC, the Commission arranges its decisions into
sections dealing with facts, arguments, admissibility of evidence, merits of
the case, and the final conclusion. However, each of these sections is scant
in both substance and reasoning. For example, in Constitutional Rights
Project v. Nigeria,36 a petition challenging a death penalty that was imposed
in violation of due process protections, the Commission adopted a scripted
presentation, "declared" a violation of the Charter provisions, and "recom-
mended" that Nigeria free the petitioners.37 Likewise, in another petition,
Civil Liberties Organization v. Nigeria,38 the Commission cursorily found
that the government enacted laws, in violation of the African Charter, to
abridge due process rights and undermine the independence of the
judiciary. However, it is fair to say that the communications procedure has
come a long way since the early days. A predictable tradition of more fully
considering petitions is slowly evolving.
A comparison of the decisions over the years shows that while room remains for
considerable improvement, the quality of the Commission's reasoning and
decision making has continued to evolve positively. In the past two years, the
decisions of the Commission have been more substantive and elaborate on the
issues of law and fact that are raised in and considered by communications.39
Nevertheless, despite signs of progress, the decisions referred to here,
and others before them, are formulaic. They do not reference jurisprudence
from national and international tribunals, nor do they fire the imagination.
They are non-binding and attract little, if any, attention from governments
and the human rights community. In the past, this lack of publicity could be
attributed to the fact that the Commission prohibited the publication of its
decisions. However, as explained by two human rights advocates, the
'African Commission has revised its strict interpretation of Article 59, which
was formerly understood to prohibit the publication of communications:
This changed with the Seventh Activity Report of the Commission, adopted by
the Assembly in June 1994. For the first time, this report made available
information on the first fifty-two communications decided by the Commission.
The information disclosed includes a summary of the parties to the communica-
tion, the factual background, and the Commission's summary decision. With
36. Communication 60/91, Afr. Comm'n Hum. Peoples' Rts., AHG/Res. 240 (XXXI)(1995),
reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 28 (1997).
37. See id.
38. Communication 129/94, Afr. Comm'n Hum. Peoples' Rts., AHG/Res.250 (XXXII)(1 996),
reprinted in 18 HuM. RTs. L.J. 35, 36 (1997).
39. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu & Camilla Christensen, The African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures,
20 HuM. RTs. Q. 235, 277 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
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the adoption of the Commission's Eighth and Ninth Annual Activity Reports, the
Commission went a step further and issued full texts of its final decisions0
Now the decisions may be published but the Commission must first obtain
permission from the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
41
Although the Commission's decision-making procedure appears quasi-
judicial, the Commission sees its principal objective as creating a dialogue
between the parties, leading to the amicable settlement of the dispute in
question. 42 In any case, neither the Charter nor the Commission provides for
enforceable remedies or a mechanism for encouraging and tracking state
compliance with decisions. Thus, to many victims, the Commission's
findings are too remote if not virtually meaningless.
43
In addition to, and emblematic of, the Charter and the Commission's
lack of enforcement mechanisms is the state reporting procedure that is
required by the Charter.44 The Charter tersely provides that every two years,
states shall submit a "report on the legislative or other measures taken with
a view to giving effect to the rights and freedoms" enumerated in it.
4
1
However, the Charter does not say to what body the reports are to be
submitted, whether, how, and with what goal the reports should be
evaluated, and what action should be taken after such evaluation. The
Commission, not surprisingly, has filled in these gaps by borrowing heavily
from other treaty bodies.46 Unfortunately, it has mimicked both the good
and the bad in those bodies.
The Reporting Guidelines, which are detailed, are supposed to guide
states in the preparation of their reports. In particular, the Guidelines specify
both the form and content of reports.47 Thus reports must describe in detail
40. Id. at 278.
41. The Charter provides that all "measures taken within the provisions of the present
Charter shall remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government shall otherwise decide." African Charter, supra note 4, art. 59(1).
42. See Communications 16/88, 17/88, 18/88 Comite Culturel pour la Democratie au
Benin, Hilaire Badjogoume, El Hadj Boubacare Diawara v. Benin (merits), Afr. Comm'n
Hum. Peoples' Rts., 35 (1994), reprinted in Odinkalu & Christensen, supra note 36, at
244 n.51 (noting, inter alia, that "[i]t is the primary objective of the Commission in the
Communications procedure to initiate a dialogue between the parties which will result
in an amicable settlement to the satisfaction of both and which remedies the prejudice
complained of").
43. See AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAv, REPORT ON THE 16TH SESSION FTHE
AFRICAN COMMISsION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTs 62-83 (1996) for more communications
by the Commission. For a very thoughtful analysis of the communications procedure
before the African Commission, see Odinkalu & Christensen, supra note 36.
44. African Charter, supra note 4, art. 62.
45. Id.
46. See Felice D. Gaer, First Fruits: Reporting By States Under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, 10 NErH. Q. HUM. RTS. 29 (1992), for an evaluation of the




the legislative regime as well as the actual application and protection of
specific human rights.48 In reality, however, many of the reports submitted
thus far have been woefully inadequate on both counts. 49 For example, the
initial report of Ghana was only a scant five pages.50 Similarly, Egypt's
report, although a voluminous fifty pages, only described abstractly some
legislation without commentary on the state of human rights conditions on
the ground."'
Once submitted, reports are examined in public. State representatives
and the commissioners engage in "constructive dialogue" to assist and
encourage states to implement the Charter. After considering a report, the
Commission communicates its comments and general observations to the
state in question. 2 However, although the Charter came into force in 1987,
the majority of state parties have not submitted their reports, and the
Commission has been powerless to force compliance. 3 Thus, the reporting
process seems to have yielded very little so far, as many of the state
representatives have appeared either incompetent or ill-prepared. 4 In
addition to the fact that states do not seem to take the reporting process
seriously, the comments and observations of the Commission on the few
state reports that have been submitted have not had any discernable effect
on those states.
However, the African Commission has taken some steps that have the
potential to increase its impact on states. For example, one of the
Commission's members has been appointed as a Special Rapporteur on
Summary and Extra-judicial Executions.5 This appointment is potentially
significant if the office is used to investigate, report, and facilitate dialogue
with states.56 Additionally, the Commission's country-specific and thematic
resolutions raise the Commission's visibility and engage states directly. For
example, one Commission resolution called on Sudan to allow detainees
access to lawyers and doctors and asked the government to support
negotiations for the settlement of the conflict with the south. 7 Another
48. See id.
49. See generally ANKUMAH, supra note 24, at 79-110.
50. See id. at 91-92.
51. See id.
52. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 22, rules 81-87.
53. See Mohamed Komeja, The African System of Human and Peoples' Rights: an
Annotated Bibliography, 3 E. AFR. J. PEAcE & HuM. RTS. 262, 274-75 (1996).
54. See ANKUMAH, supra note 24, at 99.
55. See Rachel Murray, Report on the 1996 Sessions of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights, 19th and 20th Ordinary Sessions, 26 March-4 April, and 21-31
October 1996, 18 HuM. RTS. L.J. 16, 18 (1997).
56. See id.
57. See AFRICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 40, at 89-90.
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Commission resolution18 urged African states to respect the rights of
prisoners and to ratify the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment.59 However small and tentative, these are
steps in the right direction. Perhaps the African Human Rights Court will
help clarify the roles and functions of the Commission and thereby
embolden it.
Ill. THE RATIONALE FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
Both the European and the Inter-American human rights systems give the
impression that a human rights court is an essential, if not indispensable,
component of an effective regime for the protection of human rights. Norms
prescribing state conduct are not meaningful unless they are anchored in
functioning and effective institutions. In the case of the African regional
system, this truism merits special attention because both the norms in the
African Charter and the African Commission itself have been regarded as
weak and ineffectual-hence the push for a human rights court, an
institution that would correct some of the more glaring failures of the
African system.
There are two possible polar views on the creation of an African Human
Rights Court. One view holds that a human rights court must be established
as soon as possible to salvage the entire system from its near-total
irrelevance and obscurity.60 According to this view, the deficiencies of the
African system-both normative and institutional-are so crippling that
only an effective human rights court can jump-start the process of its
redemption. 61 The Court is here seen as a way to put some teeth and bite
into the system in order to restrain states effectively.
The other view is gradualist and sees the work of the African system as
primarily promotional and not adjudicative.62 According to the gradualist
view, the major problem in Africa is the lack of awareness by the general
populace of its rights and the processes for vindicating those rights.
63
Proponents argue that the regional system must therefore first educate the
58. See id. at 95.
59. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985) (entered into force 26 June 1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984), substantive changes noted in 24 l.L.M. 535 (1985).
60. See Mutua, supra note 10, at 10; Komeja, supra note 51, at 277.
61. See Mutua, supra note 10, at 10.




public by promoting human rights.6 4 The task of protection, which would
include a human rights court, is seen here as less urgent.6 Critics argue that
a court might be paralyzed by the same problems that have beset the
African Commission. 66 They therefore urge that the African Commission be
strengthened instead of dissipating scarce resources to create another,
possibly impotent institution.
67
In the past several years, the gradualist view has given way to the
proponents of a human rights court. It had become clear by the mid-1 990s,
even to pro-establishment figures, that the African system was a disappoint-
ment, if not an embarrassment for the continent. In 1994, the conservative
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government asked its Secretary
General to call a meeting of government experts to "ponder in conjunction
with the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights over the means
to enhance the efficiency of the Commission in considering particularly the
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights."
68
Events moved speedily in the next several years. In September 1995, a
draft document on an African human rights court was produced by a
meeting of experts organized in Cape Town, South Africa by the OAU
Secretariat in collaboration with the African Commission and the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists. 69 Later that month, an OAU meeting of
governmental legal experts produced the Cape Town Draft of the draft
protocol for a human rights court.7 0 After several rounds of meetings and
more drafts, the Draft Protocol was adopted by the conference of OAU
Ministers of Justice/Attorneys General in December 1997. The OAU
Council of Ministers adopted the Draft Protocol in February 1998,'7 and the
OAU Assembly gave its final blessing in June 1998,72 opening the Protocol
for signature by OAU member states.
The consensus among government officials, NGOs, and academics on




67. See id. at 195.
68. Report of Government Experts Meeting, AHG/Res 230(xxx), 30th Ordinary Session of
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Tunis, Tunisia, June 1994, cited in
Ibrahim Ali Badawi EI-Sheikh, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights:
Introductory Note, 9 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 943, 943 n.1 (1997).
69. See id. at 944.
70. See Report of Government Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights, September 6-12, 1995, Cape Town, South Africa, OAU/
LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/RPT(1)Rev.1, cited in id. at 944 n.2.
71. See International Conference on Human Rights Commission Opens in Addis, supra
note 2.
72. See Pursuit for Peace Remains Major Task of Africa: Salim, supra note 2.
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gained momentum. This realization is indicative of the shortcomings that
currently plague the African system. While the push for the Court is not a
repudiation of the African Commission, it is an acknowledgment of its
general ineffectiveness. The hope appears to be that a court will strengthen
the regional system and aid it in realizing its promise. But that will not
happen unless the Court avoids the pitfalls that have trapped the African
Commission.
The presence of other regional human rights courts in the Americas and
Europe has given impetus to the African initiative and advanced the idea
within the modern African state that its conduct toward its own citizens is
no longer an internal, domestic matter. In turn, the establishment of the
African Human Rights Court will help to promote international human
rights in other regions of the world. For example, in Asia, where states have
been more resistant to the application and internalization of the human
rights corpus-and where as of yet there is no regional human rights
system-that resistance is bound to come under increasing attack by NGOs
due to the establishment of a human rights court in Africa. The regional
supervision of a state's internal conduct toward its nationals is quickly
becoming a reality. So too is the recognition that human rights are "a basic
requirement in any society and a pre-requisite for human progress and
development."
73
The African Human Rights Court is a potentially significant develop-
ment in the protection of rights on a continent that has been plagued with
serious human rights violations since colonial rule. The problems of the
African human rights system, 74 including the normative weaknesses in the
African Charter and the general impotence of its implementing body, the
African Commission, may now be addressed effectively and resolved by the
establishment of this new adjudicatory body.
IV. THE ANATOMY OF THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COURT
The function of the African Human Rights Court would be protective, and
would seek to complement the work of the African Commission, which is
73. Talks Open in Addis on Establishing African Human Rights Court, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGE Ru, 12 Dec. 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (quoting Salim
Ahmed Salim, the OAU Secretary General, at the adoption of the Draft Protocol in
December 1997).
74. For analyses of some normative and structural problems of the African human rights
system, see Gittleman, supra note 9; Flinterman & Ankumah, supra note 9; Olusola Ojo
& Amadu Sessay, The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects for the 1980s and Beyond, 8
Huht. RTs. Q. 89 (1986); and ANKUMAH, supra note 24.
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basically promotional s.7  Although the African Commission's mandate in-
cludes the protective functions of state reporting76 and the consideration of
communications 77 promotional activities have been the centerpiece of its
operations.78 Commentators agree that the Commission's state reporting and
communications procedures have been disappointing, partly due to the lack
of power and textual clarity of purpose for those functions? 9 Can the African
Human Rights Court cure these problems?
In order to entrench itself as a protector of international human rights, it
is important that the Court's jurisdiction not be circumscribed or limited to
cases or disputes that arise out of the African Charter.8 0 The Protocol
provides that actions may be brought before the Court on the basis of any
instrument, including international human rights treaties, which has been
ratified by the state party in question.8 ' Furthermore, according to the
Protocol, the Court can apply as sources of law any relevant human rights
instrument ratified by the state, in addition to the African Charter.82 The
Court will be empowered to decide if it has jurisdiction in the event of a
dispute.8 3 The Court may exercise both contentious and conciliatory
jurisdiction.8 4 It also will have advisory jurisdiction through which it may
issue advisory opinions on "any legal matter relating to the Charter or any
other relevant human rights instruments."' Such an opinion may be
requested by a wide variety of entities including a member state of the
OAU, the OAU or any of its organs, or even an African NGO, provided it is
recognized by the OAU.
86
75. The Protocol realizes this contrast-in essence the weaknesses and the incompleteness
of the African Commission-when its states in its preamble that the African Human
Rights Court will "complement and reinforce the functions of the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights." Protocol, supra note 1, pmbl. The Protocol adds that
the African Human Rights Court shall "complement the protective mandate of the
African Commission." Id. art. 2.
76. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 62.
77. See id. at arts. 55, 56. These include state-to-state and "other" communications, which
could come from individuals, groups, and organizations. Id.
78. See id. art. 45. The principal activities of the African Charter, which are promotional,
are to collect documents, undertake studies, organize seminars, disseminate informa-
tion, encourage national and local institutions concerned with human rights, formulate
principles to resolve human rights problems, and interpret the African Charter. Id.
79. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 8; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSToN, INTERNATIONAL HUM N RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT: LAw, PoLTmcs, MoRALs 700-704 (1996).
80. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3(1) (extending the Court's jurisdiction to the African
Charter "and any other relevant Human Rights instrument . .
81. Id.
82. Id. art. 7.
83. See id. art. 3(2).
84. Id. art. 9 Article 9 allows the court to attempt the "amicable settlement" of disputes. Id.
85. Id. art. 4(1).
86. See id.
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One serious shortcoming of the proposed African Human Rights Court
is the limitation of access placed by the Draft Protocol on individuals and
NGOs. The Protocol provides for two types of access to the Court:
automatic and optional. The African Commission, state parties, and African
intergovernmental organizations enjoy unfettered or "automatic" access to
the Court once a state ratifies the Draft Protocol.87 In stark contrast,
individuals and NGOs cannot bring a suit against a state unless two
conditions are met. First, the Court will have discretion to grant or deny
such access.88 Second, at the time of ratification of the Draft Protocol or
thereafter the state must have made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court to hear such cases. 9
While limiting the access of NGOs and individuals to the Court may
have been necessary to get states on board, 90 it is nevertheless disappointing
and a terrible blow to the standing and reputation of the Court in the eyes of
most Africans. After all, it is individuals and NGOs, and not the African
Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or state parties,
who will be the primary beneficiaries and users of the Court. The proposed
Court is not meant to be an institution for the protection of the rights of
states or OAU organs. A human rights court is primarily a forum for
protecting citizens against the state and other state agencies. This limitation
will render the proposed Court virtually meaningless unless it is interpreted
broadly and liberally.
The Court will be technically independent of the African Commission
although it may request the Commission's opinion with respect to the
admissibility of a case brought by an individual or an NGO.91 In ruling on
the admissibility of a case, the Court will also be required to take into
account the requirements that communications must meet under the African
Charter before submission to the Commission.9 2 Presumably, the Court will
not hear cases that do not meet these criteria. The Court may also consider
cases or transfer them to the African Commission.
93
87. See id. arts. 5(l), 5(2).
88. See id. art. 5(3) (providing that the "tclourt may entitle relevant Non Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) with observer status before the [African] Commission, and
individuals to institute cases directly before it") (emphasis added).
89. See id. arts. 5(3), 34(6).
90. Ambassador Badawi, a member of the African Commission and its former chair, alludes
to this when he notes that "[tihe question of allowing NGOs and individuals to submit
cases to the Court was one of the most complicated issues during the consideration of
the Draft Protocol." Badawi EI-Sheikh, supra note 68, at 947.
91. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6(1).
92. See id. art. 6(2). See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 56, for a list of the requirements
that communications before the African Commission must consider it.
93. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
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While linked to the Commission it is vital that the Court determines its
own rules of procedure in order to enhance its independence. The Protocol
provides some general rules of procedure.9 4 In addition, the Protocol
provides that proceedings before the Court generally should be conducted
in public and that parties will be entitled to legal representation of their own
choice.95 As well, witnesses or parties to a case "shall enjoy all protection
and facilities, in accordance with international law"96 in connection with
their appearance before the Court. This guarantee will shield witnesses from
various pressures and intimidation and facilitate their ability to participate
more fully and freely in proceedings.
The proposed Court would be composed of eleven judges elected in
their individual capacity by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and
Government from among "jurists of high moral character and of recognized
practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of
human and peoples' rights." 97 Judges would serve for a six-year term and be
eligible for re-election only once.98 It is a shortcoming that all judges, except
the President of the Court, would only serve on a part-time basis.99 Although
the judges' independence would be formally guaranteed and they would be
protected by diplomatic immunity under international law, 100 the fact that
the judges are only in part-time service would undermine the integrity and
independence of the Court. A judge may only be removed by the
unanimous decisionof all the other judges of the Court.1' 1 A judge who is a
national of a state party to a case must be recused to avoid bias.102 It is an
important consideration that the Court appoints its own registrar and registry
staff.103
The proposed Court is given wide powers in conducting proceedings. It
seems to have discretionary jurisdiction and need not take all the cases that
come before it.104 This should allow the Court to avoid overload and to hear
only those cases that have the potential to advance human rights protection
in a meaningful way. If the Court does decide to hear a case, the Court may
hear submissions from all parties, including oral, written, and expert
94. See id. art. 33.
95. See id. art. 10(1 ),(2). Free legal representation may also be provided where the "interests
of justice so require." Id. art. 10(2).
96. Id. art. 10(3).
97. Id. art. 11(1).
98. See id. art. 15 (1).
99. See id. art. 15(4).
100. See id. art. 17.
101. See id. art. 19.
102. See id. art. 22.
103. See id. art. 24.
104. See Protocol, supra note 1, art. 3(2).
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testimony.10 States are required to assist the Court and provide facilities for
the efficient handling of cases.'06 Once the Court finds a violation, it may
order remedies, including "fair compensation or reparation." 0 7 In cases of
"extreme gravity and urgency," the Court may order provisional remedies,
such as an injunction, to avoid actual or potential irreparable harm to
victims. 10 8
The Court's judgments, which will be final and without appeal, 10 9 will
be binding on states." 0 In its annual report to the OAU, the Court is to list
specifically those states that have not complied with its judgments."' This is
a "shaming" tactic that marks the violator. The OAU Council of Ministers is
required to monitor the execution of the judgment on behalf of the OAU
Assembly. 1 2 Presumably the OAU Assembly can take additional measures
to force compliance, such as passing resolutions urging states to respect the
Court's judgments. Alternatively, the OAU Chairman could be empowered
to write to delinquent states asking that they honor the Court's judgments.
V. WHAT SHOULD THE HUMAN RIGHTS COURT DO?
Critics and supporters alike have argued that it makes little sense to create
an institution that duplicates the weaknesses of the African Commission. In
the context of the OAU, an organization with scarce financial resources and
limited moral clarity and vision, the establishment of a new body should be
approached somberly. A human rights court will only be useful if it
genuinely seeks to correct the shortcomings of the African human rights
system and provides victims of human rights violations with a real and
accessible forum in which to vindicate their basic rights. What the OAU and
the African regional system do not need is yet another remote and opaque
bureaucracy that promises little and delivers nothing. If the Court is to be
such a bureaucracy, then it would make more sense to expend additional
resources and energy to address the problems of the African Commission
and defer the establishment of a court for another day. Several important
105. See id. art. 26.
106. See id. art. 26(1).
107. Id. art. 27(1).
108. Id. art. 27(2).
109. See id. art. 28(2).
110. See id. art. 30 (providing, in part, that states "undertake to comply with the judgment in
any case in which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to
guarantee its execution") (emphasis added).
111. Seeid. art. 31.
112. See id. art. 29(1).
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questions will have to be addressed if the Human Rights Court is to become
a significant player in human rights in Africa.
The most pressing issues facing the new Court are normative and
institutional. These issues require the Charter's amendment and revision.
First, the African Charter, the Court's basic instrument, has deep normative
flaws that must be addressed to give the Court a firm legal basis to protect
human rights. In particular, "clawback" clauses permeate the African
Charter and permit African states to restrict basic human rights to the
maximum extent allowed by domestic law.1 3 This is especially significant
because most domestic laws in Africa date from the colonial period and are
therefore highly repressive and draconian. The post-colonial state, like its
predecessor, impermissibly restricts most civil and political rights, particu-
larly those pertaining to political participation, free expression, association
and assembly, movement, and conscience. Ironically, it is these same rights
that the African Charter further erodes.
'Clawback' clauses, that is, qualifications or limitations, permeate the provisions
[of the African Charter] dealing with fundamental freedoms . . . . These
fundamental civil and political rights are severely limited by clauses like 'except
for reasons and conditions previously laid down by law,' 'subject to law and
order,' 'within the law,' 'abides by the law,' 'in accordance with the provisions of
the law,' and other restrictions justified for the 'protection of national security.'
"14
The African Charter also lacks a general derogation clause, which
appears to be unnecessary because states are in effect permitted by the
"clawback" clauses to suspend, de facto, certain rights by enacting
legislation." 5 In any event, nothing in the Charter prevents African states
from denying certain rights during national "emergencies."1 6 A revision of
the Charter should excise the offending "clawback" clauses, insert a
provision on nonderogable rights, and another specifying which rights states
can derogate from, when, and under what conditions.
Another area of normative controversy concerns women's rights. There
is a perceptiofh and fear that either the African Charter does not adequately
protect, or it could be used to abuse, women's rights." 7 Of particular
113. See Mutua, supra note 10, at 7.
114. Id. at 7.
115. See Arthur E. Anthony, Beyond the Paper Tiger: The Challenge of a Human Rights Court
in Africa, 32 TEx. INTL L.J. 511, 518 (1997).
116. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 19, at 233-34.
117. For discussions of the African Charter's view on women, see Claude E. Welch, Jr.,
Human Rights and African Women: A Comparison of Protection under Two Major
Treaties, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 549 (1993); Florence Butegwa, Using the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights to Secure Women's Access to Land in Africa, in HUMAN
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concern are the "family" provisions that have been thought to condone and
support repressive and retrogressive structures and practices of social and
political ordering." 8 These provisions, which place duties to the family on
the state and individuals, have been interpreted as entrenching oppressive
family structures that marginalize and exclude women from participation in
most spheres outside the home. Others feel that the provisions support the
discriminatory treatment of women on the basis of gender -in marriage,
property ownership, and inheritance, and impose on them unconscionable
labor and reproductive burdens. But, as this article has argued elsewhere,
the Charter can be read differently:
However, these are not the practices that the Charter condones when it requires
states to assist families as the 'custodians of morals and traditional values.' Such
an interpretation would be a cynical misreading of the Charter. The reference is
to those traditional values which enhanced the dignity of the individual and
emphasized the dignity of motherhood and the importance of the female as the
central link in the reproductive chain; women were highly valued as equals in
the process of the regeneration of life.u 9
The Charter's veneration of African culture could be construed as
reinforcing gender oppression.120 The charge here is that the Charter sees
itself as the savior of an African culture that is permanent, static, and
unchanging. Viewed this way, the Charter would freeze in time and protect
from reform, radical change, or repudiation of those cultural norms,
practices, and institutions that are harmful to women. Again, this article
argues that the Charter, taken in its totality as a human rights document,
does not support such a reading.
The Charter guarantees, unambiguously and without equivocation, the equal
rights of women in its gender and equality provision by requiring states to
RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 495 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994);
Chaloka Beyani, Toward a More Effective Guarantee of Women's Rights in the African
Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
285 (Rebecca Cook, ed. 1994; J. Oloka-Onyango, The Plight of the Larger Half: Human
Rights, Gender Violence and the Legal Status of Refugee and Internally Displaced
Women in Africa, 24 DENV. J. INTL L. & PoL'Y 349, 371-74 (1996).
118. See African Charter, supra note 4, art. 18 (referring to the family as the "natural unit and
basis of society" and requiring the state to "assist the family which is the custodian of
morals and traditional values recognized by the community"). Elsewhere, the Charter
provides that the individual owes "duties towards his family and society." Id. art. 27(1).
Further, the African Charter states that every individual has the duty to "preserve the
harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the
family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need." Id. art.
29(1).
119. See Mutua, supra note 8, at 371-72 (footnote omitted).
120. See id. at 371.
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"eliminate every discrimination against women" and to protect women's rights
in international human rights instruments. Read in conjunction with other
provisions, the Charter leaves no room for discriminatory treatment against
women.
121
To allay these fears, however, and to prevent a conservative human rights
court from ever giving the Charter a discriminatory interpretation in gender
matters, the African Charter should be supplemented by an optional
protocol to fully address women's rights issues in all their complexity and
multiple dimensions.
122
Besides the normative set of problems that face the Human Rights
Court, there are also institutional problems. These concerns are external to
the Court and are compounded by matters internal to it, such as the tenure
of judges and its effect on the independence of the Court and the limitation
of access to the Court to individuals and NGOs. In addition, it is absolutely
critical that the Court be, and be perceived as, separate and independent
from the African Commission to avoid burdening it with the severe image
problems and the anemia associated with its older sibling. This is possible if
there is a clear division of labor between the African Human Rights Court
and the African Commission. That is not currently the case. A court was not
contemplated by the drafters of the African Charter, and as a result, the
African Commission was vested with both promotional and protective
functions, such as the individual complaint procedure, which make the
Commission "court-like" because of their quasi-judicial character.
To address this institutional concern, the African Charter should be
revised. The protective functions of the African Commission should be
removed and vested exclusively within the African Human Rights Court.
The African Commission should only be charged with promotional func-
tions including the monitoring of state reporting and the facilitating of
dialogue with NGOs and government institutions in member states to
encourage the incorporation of human rights norms into state policies and
121. See Mutua, supra note 10, at 372 (footnote omitted). The Charter states that the "state
shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the
protection of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international
declarations and conventions." African Charter, supra note 4, art. 18(3). The Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is among
the international conventions that would be applicable here. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979,
G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GOAR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/36 (1980)
(entered into force 3 Sept. 1981), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980). Normatively, the
CEDAW is perceived as a very progressive and forward-looking document.
122. There already have been calls for a protocol on women's rights. See Murray, supra note
48, at 16, 19.
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domestic legislation.123 This unambiguous demarcation of areas of compe-
tence should alleviate the problem of hierarchy or "competition" between
the two institutions, and may enhance cooperation and mutual reinforce-
ment. Importantly, such a division of labor should prevent tainting one body
with the baggage of the other. Thus the African Commission would clearly
be the "political" body, while the Court would alone be the judicial or
"legal" organ of the African human rights system.
As the sole adjudicatory body in the African legal system, the African
Court must consider the three basic purposes that are associated with
national and international adjudicatory bodies: 1) vindicating the rule of
law by providing justice in an individual case; 2) protecting rights through
deterrence and behavior modification; and 3) expounding legal instruments
and making law through elucidation and interpretation. 124 To fulfill its
promise, the African Human Rights Court will have to reflect carefully on
these roles and decide where it has the potential to make a meaningful
contribution.
While the African Human Rights Court should primarily be a forum for
protecting citizens against the state, it should not be viewed as a forum for
offering individual justice to victims of human rights violations. While such
a goal is certainly noble, it is by all means impossible. The Court can act
neither as a forum of first instance nor as the mandatory court of appeal for
all cases. Cast in this role, the Court would be paralyzed by a torrential
caseload. The most poignant example that warns of this potential paralysis
is the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the body that oversees the
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 2s
Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, individuals can petition the HRC
for the vindication of their rights.126 The HRC's use of a mandatory juris-
diction to consider all admissible cases has created at least three years of
backlog.127 The possible ratification of the Optional Protocol by states with
123. At a recent meeting, NGOs and members of the African Commission started a dialogue
on possible amendments and revisions to the African Charter. These included women's
rights, "clawback" clauses, and derogation of rights. See id. at 19.
124. See Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for
the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., forthcoming 1999) (see text at the beginning of
section entitled "Purposes of Adjudication").
125. ICCPR, supra note 21.
126. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted
16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21 Sess., Supp. No. 16, at arts. 1,
2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).
127. For statistics on the twenty years since the HRC communications procedure became
effective under the Optional Protocol, see Report of the Human Rights Committee to the
General Assembly: Official Records, U.N.GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 40, section
VII(A), at 74, U.N. Doc A/52/40, Vol.1 (1997).
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large populations such as China, India, the United States, and Indonesia-
together with the growing familiarity by victims with the procedure-can
only underscore the complete inability of the HRC to respond to all
individual cases.
The African Human Rights Court need not make the mistake of the
HRC. It will not survive if it adopts a mandatory jurisdiction because the
volume of cases is bound to be enormous. Instead the Court should only
hear those cases that have the potential to expound on the African Charter
and make law that would guide African states in developing legal and
political cultures that respect human rights. In other words, the Court should
not be concerned with individual cases where it looks, as it were,
backwards, attempting to correct or punish a historical wrong to an
individual. Rather, the Court should look forward and create a body of law
with precedential value and an interpretation of the substantive law of the
African Charter and other key universal human rights documents to guide
and direct states. Such forward-looking decisions would deter states from
future misconduct by modifying their behavior. Individual justice would be
a coincidence in the few cases the Court would hear. Moreover, individual
courts in OAU member states should look to the African Human Rights
Court for direction in the development and application of human rights law.
Finally, the African Human Rights Court would benefit tremendously
from the experiences of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as well as national fora such as
the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which have taken the lead in
developing human rights jurisprudence. The Court should closely examine
the factors that have made these institutions effective. Some authors have
identified a checklist of such factors that the African Human Rights Court
ought to contemplate.12 For example, Heifer and Slaughter have organized
these factors into three clusters: 1) factors that state parties to the treaty
creating the Court control (such as the tribunal's composition, its investiga-
tive powers, and the legal status of its decisions); 2) factors that the tribunal
itself controls such as quality of legal reasoning and degrees of autonomy
from political interests; and 3) factors beyond the control of the tribunal and
the state parties such as the cultural identities of states and the nature of
abuses monitored by the tribunals. 129 This checklist can be particularly
useful if judges are independent and motivated by the drive to make the
African Human Rights Court the central institution in the development of a
legal culture based on the rule of law.
128. See generally Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 298-337 (1997).
129. Id. at 298-337.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Africa has been traumatized by human rights violations over the last five
centuries. The recent chapter in that long history of abuses is still being
authored under the direction of the post-colonial state. But the peoples of
Africa, like peoples elsewhere, have never stopped struggling for better
conditions of life, and especially for more enlightened and accountable
political societies. The popular repudiation of one-party and undemocratic
states over the past decade has once again given hope that the predatory
impulses of the post-colonial state can be arrested. Within states, NGOs
have multiplied during the last ten years, and governments have been
forced to revise policies and laws that are offensive to basic human rights. At
the continental level, NGOs and human rights advocates have demanded
that the African Commission become part of this movement toward change.
It is in this context that the idea of an African Human Rights Court was
hatched. It was felt by many Africans that, while the African Commission
was a step in the right direction, it was largely ineffectual. A regional human
rights system worth its name needed strong institutions to anchor its norms.
The African Human Rights Court is an attempt to fill this void. However, the
Court promises to be a disappointment unless state parties revisit the African
Charter and strengthen many of its substantive provisions. Moreover, the
Court will not meet the expectations of Africans if the OAU does not
provide it with material and moral support to allow it to function as the
independent and significant institution that it ought to be. Finally, the initial
integrity and vitality of the Court will rest with those who will be privileged
to serve as its first bench. Unless these conditions are met, the African
Human Rights Court is condemned to remain a two-legged stool, a lame
institution unable to fulfill its promise as a seat from which human rights can
be effectively protected and advanced.
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